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Almost by definition, all disruptive technologies or innovations threaten 
vested interests. If markets and the legal environment are sufficiently flexible 
– and in the United States, for the most they are – innovations that buyers 
want diffuse throughout the economy despite the opposition. 
There are cases, however, where the existing order uses the legal system 
to fight back, to forestall or delay change. Napster is a case in point: it 
threatened the established recording industry, which eventually persuaded the 
courts to shut down that particular form of peer-to-peer file transfer. But even 
in this case, “the law” has failed to stop innovation. Other peer-to-peer 
networks have found ways to legally permit free Internet-based file transfers, 
while some companies – notably Apple – have developed business models 
around paid file transfer. 
As other papers in this volume make clear, prediction markets represent 
yet another disruptive innovation. Who might they threaten, and will the law 
get in way? 
Tom Bell implicitly, if not explicitly, answers this question in his 
important survey of the legal issues raised by prediction markets. Both federal 
regulators and in-house lawyers of major companies that could benefit from 
allowing their employees to participate in even limited prediction markets, for 
different reasons, appear to have some anxiety about allowing such markets. 
Regulators seem to be wary of encouraging speculation, or permitting 
prediction markets to become vehicles for money laundering. In-house 
lawyers are nervous of running afoul of various federal securities and 
commodities trading laws and regulations, overseen by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), respectively.  In short, the law indeed is inhibiting the 
diffusion of prediction markets, and Bell’s excellent article explains how.  
One obvious way in which federal regulators could improve the legal 
climate would be to provide a safe harbor for prediction markets that meet 
certain conditions. This they have done for public markets like the Iowa 
Presidential exchange: most importantly, the stakes must be small. At this 
writing, the CFTC also has announced its intention to construct a different 
safe harbor for in-house corporate prediction markets. Bell outlines in his 
article some useful principles for the CFTC to follow when it finally gets 
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ready to implement this idea. The most important one: keep federal hands off 
of these markets, to the extent possible.  
Even a relatively broad safe harbor from the CFTC, however, may not 
give in-house corporate lawyers the legal certainty they need to feel 
comfortable. The CFTC cannot tell the SEC how to exercise its jurisdiction. 
Further, the extent to which a safe harbor from the CFTC would preempt state 
gambling laws, especially in this context, may have to be litigated to provide 
clarity.  
One issue which is outside Bell’s purview, but which nonetheless also 
could slow the adoption of prediction markets by corporations relates to 
organizational behavior. Prediction markets have the potential to have similar 
or maybe even more profound impacts on large corporations as spreadsheet 
software once did (and may be still be having). Programs like Excel gave 
huge power to senior executives who knew how to use it, and thereby 
threatened the usefulness and ultimately the jobs of large numbers of middle 
managers whose job was to gather and process information.  
Likewise, by harnessing the “wisdom of crowds,” prediction markets 
threaten to trump the judgment of designated “experts” within corporate 
structures. Those experts understandably might try to resist, either by keeping 
their companies from using such markets in the first instance, or by finding 
various ways to sideline or slow the use of those markets if they somehow 
penetrate the palace gates.  
Fortunately, for the companies profiled in this volume, these kinds of 
corporate roadblocks do not yet appear to have been a major problem. But I 
suspect that for other companies, they have been or will be. For these 
companies, even greater legal certainty thus will not lead to greater use of 
prediction markets. 
My guess, therefore, is that if enlightened lawyers follow the advice 
outlined by Tom Bell, prediction markets will gain surer footing in the 
marketplace the old-fashioned way: through the force of competition. 
Companies that gain an edge in the marketplace because of better forecasts 
eventually should induce others to follow in their wake. If prediction markets 
don’t deliver much benefit, however, then even constructive legal reform 
can’t ensure their use.  
 
